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Abstract
Are temporary jobs a port of entry into permanent employment? In
this paper we argue that the answer crucially depends on the type of tem-
porary contracts being considered, as the di⁄erent contracts observed in
practice are typically characterized by varying combinations of training,
tax-incentives and EPL provisions. We base our empirical evidence on a
longitudinal sample of labour market entrants in Italy, a country where a
large number of temporary contracts coexist with a relatively high employ-
ment protection for standard employees. We estimate dynamic multino-
mial logit models with ￿xed e⁄ects, to allow for non-random sorting of
workers into the di⁄erent types of contracts. We show that the transition
to permanent employment is more likely for individuals holding any type
of temporary contracts than for the unemployed, thus broadly con￿rming
the existence of port-of-entry e⁄ects. Yet, not all temporary contracts
are the same: training contracts are the best port of entry, while free-
lance contracts are the worst. We also show that temporary contracts are
generally a port-of-entry into a permanent position within the same em-
ployer, but not across ￿rms, implying that little general-purpose training
is gained while on temporary jobs. Moreover, the time needed for an in-
ternal transformation from a temporary to a permanent position appears
rather long, suggesting that ￿rms are likely to use (a sequence of) tem-
porary contracts as a cost-reduction strategy, rather than as a screening
device for newly hired workers.
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11 Introduction
The liberalization of temporary contracts has been the main labour market
policy in Europe in the last two decades, with the stated objective of increasing
labour market ￿ exibility. In many countries temporary contracts make up the
bulk of new hires, for instance over 90% in Spain (Dolado et al., 2002) and over
50% in Italy, as we document below. In 2008 the contracts of limited duration
represented 14.7% of the employed workforce in the EU25, up from a share of
11.7% in 1997 (Eurostat data).
Several reasons stand behind these developments. From the employers per-
spective, the availability of temporary jobs is tantamount to a reduction in ￿ring
costs, which is particularly valuable in an environment with incomplete informa-
tion and high employment protection for standard jobs (Bentolila and Bertola,
1990; Bertola, 1990; Booth, 1997). Temporary jobs can be attractive from the
labour supply standpoint too: they may allow a reduction of the unemployment
duration and contribute to a decline in the unemployment rates of the weakest
segments of the labour force (e.g. Alonso-Borrego et al., 2005; Blanchard and
Landier, 2002; Bover and Gomez, 2004; De Graaf-Zijl et al., 2004; Van Ours and
Vodopivec, 2006). However, all over Europe temporary jobs are often associ-
ated with poorer labour conditions with respect to standard employment: lower
wages, lower training, higher job insecurity and lower protection from social
security (e.g. Booth et al., 2002; Berton et al., 2009; Clark and Postel-Vinay,
2009). Furthermore, concerns have been expressed that people in such ￿ exible
working arrangements may be trapped into precarious career paths increasing
the risks of social exclusion (e.g., D￿ Addio and Rosholm, 2005). At the extreme,
temporary jobs may simply provide disadvantaged unemployed individuals with
a valuable income-generating opportunity, but without signi￿cantly enhancing
their human capital, social network and future employability, as in the case of
the French temporary jobs considered by Magnac (2000).
One of the main questions surrounding the introduction and liberalization
of temporary workers - and the one that we aim at answering in this paper - is
therefore whether they ultimately represent a port of entry to open-ended jobs.
We contribute to the existing empirical literature in two main ways. First, we
show that the answer to this question crucially depends on the type of tempo-
rary contract being considered (e.g. ￿xed term, training, apprenticeship, free-
lance). This is because the di⁄erent contracts observed in practice are typically
characterized by varying combinations of training, tax-incentives for ￿rms and
EPL provisions, implying that some ￿contract packages￿are more e⁄ective in
providing port-of-entry mechanisms for workers while others just increase the
￿ exibility of ￿rms￿workforce. A disaggregated analysis of the main types of
temporary contracts can help us understand the role that temporary jobs can
have in a⁄ecting a worker￿ s career. From a policy perspective, it can also con-
tribute to illuminate discussions on how to shape temporary work legislation.
In fact, in most EU Countries ￿xed term, training, apprenticeship and freelance
contracts are available in addition to open ended ones. However, despite the
EU has tried to give its members a common legislative framework for the use of
2temporary contracts (e.g. the directive 1999/70), many di⁄erences still persist
in their actual phrasing (e.g., ILO, 2003; OECD, 2000; Bassanini et al., 2005,
Bertolini et al, 2008). Most of the existing empirical literature, however, ag-
gregates temporary contracts in a single category, thereby ignoring a relevant
source of heterogeneity.
Second, we show that much can be learned on temporary contracts by dis-
tinguishing between transitions occurring within the same ￿rm (e.g. a trans-
formation from a temporary to a permanent contract) and those happening
between di⁄erent ￿rms, with or without any intervening spell of unemployment.
The distinction - often neglected in the existing literature due to lack of suitable
data - can provide evidence on the ability of temporary jobs to increase workers￿
general versus ￿rm-speci￿c human capital. It can also inform on the reasons
employers o⁄er temporary contracts to newly hired workers.
To make our points, we use a longitudinal matched employer-employee data-
base drawn from WHIP, the Work Histories Italian Panel. This dataset has
several advantages for studying empirically the port-of-entry hypothesis. First,
we are able to observe the detailed labour market history of a large number of
young workers, over 6000 individuals, since they enter their ￿rst employment
spell and for a long time period (from 1998 to 2004). In particular, the data
record each individual￿ s transitions between seven labour market states following
entry: four di⁄erent types of temporary contracts (namely, ￿xed-term contracts;
training contracts; apprenticeship; freelance work), open-ended contracts, self-
employment and non-employment. Second, given the large sample size, we can
a⁄ord to look only at labour market entrants, thereby circumventing any initial
condition problem that often plague the econometric analyses of labour market
transitions. Third, because we use register data (as opposed to survey data), we
can avoid sample selectivity problems related to non-random attrition or non-
response. Moreover, the observed transitions are not a⁄ected by recall biases
and other measurement errors are likely to be minimal. Forth, because of the
matched employer-employee nature, we are able to observe whether the worker
is employed in the same ￿rm in two di⁄erent points in time, with the same or
with a di⁄erent contract; i.e. we can distinguish between job changes across
￿rms and contract transformations within the same ￿rm.
To test the port of entry hypothesis, we estimate dynamic multinomial logit
models with ￿xed e⁄ects, to allow for non-random sorting of workers into the dif-
ferent types of contracts. These models aim at estimating how past employment
status (e.g., training contract) a⁄ect the chances of transiting towards any of
the other states (e.g. ￿xed term contract, or non employment). Here the main
econometric challenge is to disentangle the causal e⁄ect of past employment
states from spurious selection due to unobserved individual characteristics. By
allowing for individual ￿xed e⁄ects, our models are well placed for dealing with
this challenge. In addition, the models turned out to be tractable even when
transitions between as many as seven labour market states were considered,
which was crucial given our aims. While the Markovian assumption embedded
in these models imply that the dynamics of the process is kept relatively simple,
the crucial advantage is that the estimates of transition parameters are robust
3to any speci￿cation of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (Magnac,
2000).
Our main results are as follows. After controlling for unobserved hetero-
geneity, we show that the transition to permanent employment is more likely
for individuals holding any type of temporary contracts than for the unem-
ployed, thus broadly con￿rming the existence of port-of-entry e⁄ects. Yet, not
all temporary contracts are the same. Training contracts are the best port of
entry; they provide formal training alongside a lower labour cost and non neg-
ligible EPL provisions. Freelance contracts are the worst; they have no EPL
provisions, no training and low labour cost. We also show that temporary con-
tracts are generally a port-of-entry into a permanent position within the same
￿rm, but not across ￿rms (none of them), implying that little general-purpose
training is gained while on temporary jobs. Moreover, the time needed for
an internal transformation from a temporary to a permanent position appears
rather long, suggesting that ￿rms are likely to use (a sequence of) ￿xed term and
training contracts as a cost-reduction strategy, rather than as a screening device
for newly hired workers. The only condition that increases the probability of
getting an open ended contract in a new ￿rm is having had a long employment
spell with an open ended contract in the current ￿rm.
Our paper is related to a number of recent empirical contributions testing the
port-of-entry hypothesis of temporary contracts. Booth et al. (2002) for the UK,
Hagen (2003) for Germany and Addison and Sur￿eld (2009) for the USA provide
evidence in favour of the port-of-entry hypothesis; Hotchkiss (1999) and Autor
and Houseman (2002) for the US, G￿ell and Petrongolo (2007) and Casquel and
Cunyat (2004) for Spain, De Graaf-Zijl et al. (2004) for the Netherlands and
Magnac (2000) for France instead ￿nd little evidence of port of entry e⁄ects. As
for Italy, the evidence is mixed. Gagliarducci (2005) uses retrospective survey
data and shows that the probability of obtaining an open ended job grows
with the duration of the current spell in temporary employment, but decreases
with the number of past temporary spells. His multi-state multi-spell duration
analysis allows for a rich dynamics and for random unobserved heterogeneity,
but computational tractability requires that the analysis be con￿ned to only
three, highly aggregated, labour market states. The same aggregation is used by
Picchio (2008) who ￿nds evidence of port-of-entry in a di⁄erent survey dataset.
Ichino et al. (2008) instead focus on one speci￿c type of temporary contracts
- agency contracts - and ￿nd that they act as a port of entry in Tuscany but
not in Sicily. By showing that the existence of the port of entry hypothesis is
intimately linked to the type of temporary contracts being considered, as well as
to whether transitions are observed between or within ￿rms, our results intend
to add to this strand of the literature.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews the theoretical reasons for
the di⁄erent forms of state dependence, while section 3 presents our econometric
approach. Section 4 presents the data. Sections 5 and 6, respectively, discuss
the descriptive evidence and the econometric estimates. Section 7 draws the
main conclusions and the appendix brie￿ y depicts the institutional framework.
42 The theoretical framework
A number of reasons emerge in the literature to explain why temporary jobs may
act as a port of entry into open ended employment, which may occur both within
the same ￿rm - i.e., the temporary contract is converted into an open ended one
- or between ￿rms, with or without an intervening spell of unemployment.
Within the same ￿rm, temporary jobs can be used as a screening device.
Since ability cannot be perfectly observed, employers often decide to post tem-
porary vacancies in order to screen the workers, and to retain with an open
ended contract only the ones who proved to be more productive. To assess
the relevance of a screening device argument, the analyst is required to have
information relative to the length of the learning process about the ￿rm-worker
match quality, so as to determine whether a worker￿ s permanence in a given
￿rm with a temporary contract is justi￿ed by a "normal" screening process. To
the best of our knowledge no such measure is available in the literature.1
Temporary work in one ￿rm may also be a port of entry to open ended
employment in another ￿rm. This is more likely to occur if temporary workers
receive general purpose training in their current job, as this would increase their
human capital with respect to unemployed individuals. Even if no training is
provided, temporary jobs may allow the worker to build a network of contacts
that in turn may increase open ended employment opportunities.
But temporary jobs may also become a trap. On the one hand, when the
mechanisms leading to the port of entry are not activated during a temporary
contract, the latter will eventually result in either unemployment or successive
spells of temporary work. This may lead to human capital depreciation and a
deterioration of the future prospects of getting a permanent job, representing
one case of true "scarring e⁄ect" of temporary work.
On the other hand, the literature points to individual heterogeneity as a
mechanism sorting individuals into di⁄erent contracts, thereby explaining some
or all of the observed state dependence. Worker heterogeneity may be present in
the budget constraint, i.e. some individuals searching in the labour market may
face liquidity constraints. Despite possibly being high productivity workers,
they may rationally choose a temporary job because more protected positions
are not quickly, available. Therefore the individuals with a more stringent bud-
get constraint - who need to earn a wage as soon as possible - sort into ￿xed
term contracts (Alonso-Borrego et al., 2005; Berton and Garibaldi, 2006). In
such cases, persistence in temporary contracts is due to a possibly unobservable
(to the econometrician) confounding factor, and it should fade as soon as the
constraint relaxes.
Persistence in temporary contracts may also arise as a result of employers￿
behaviour in the face of heterogeneity in the ￿rm-worker match quality. As
pointed out by G￿ell and Petrongolo (2007), even in the presence of perfectly
observable worker types, ￿rms may use temporary contracts simply because
1Anecdotal evidence collected with interviews to human resource managers points to a
screening period of no more than nine months, depending also on the occupation.
5they are a cheaper and more ￿ exible factor of production. In this case, ￿rms are
trading o⁄ lower labour costs with a higher quit rate and the risk of losing pro-
ductive matches, as temporary workers are more likely to quit in order to accept
a better match with respect to permanent workers. Using a partial equilibrium
search and matching model, they show under what conditions temporary con-
tracts (i) are never converted to permanent contracts, (ii) are converted before
their legal limit, (iii) are converted only at the end of the legal limit. It turns
out that temporary contracts that are never converted could coexist with both
early and late conversions. In particular, both a lower match productivity and
less favorable worker￿ s outside options, which make a worker￿ s quit threat less
credible, reduce the probability of contract conversion.
When individual ability is not perfectly observable by new prospective em-
ployers there is also room for statistical discrimination.2 At least three mecha-
nisms may induce employers to believe that former temporary workers are less
productive: i) on the previous job they received less training and had themselves
a lower incentive to invest in human capital (a sort of self ful￿lling prophecy);
ii) the previous employer hired them on a temporary arrangement just to face
a demand upturn, but retention was unpro￿table due to their low productivity;
iii) they failed the screening period proving to be of lower ability. Employers
are therefore prone to o⁄er them another temporary position. In this case per-
sistence in temporary jobs is not due to some (observable or not) individual
characteristic, but to past temporary jobs themselves, leading to a second case
of true scarring e⁄ect.
As Dolado et al. (2002) point out, there is currently no theoretical approach
that is able to contemplate all these mechanisms at once; moreover, in the real
world they are likely to overlap. A fully structural model is beyond the scope of
the present work; we instead estimate a reduced form model, where we control
for the role of individual heterogeneity (unobserved to the econometrician, but
observed by the match parties) as well as possible; any remaining e⁄ects will be
interpreted in the light of what has been discussed above. In particular, a high
probability to move from a temporary to an open ended position within the
same ￿rm would support the hypothesis of temporary contracts as a screening
device, provided that the length of the temporary contract is not exceedingly
long. A transition from a temporary contract to an open ended position held
in a di⁄erent ￿rm will instead be interpreted as evidence for a more general
port of entry hypothesis, e.g. temporary jobs allow workers to gain general
purpose human capital. Persistence in temporary jobs will be interpreted as
a true scarring e⁄ect of past temporary work when emerging from transitions
across ￿rms; when emerging within the ￿rm it would support the idea of cost
reduction behaviour by the employers. From this perspective, the possibility of
observing transitions between di⁄erent types of contracts - i.e. di⁄erent mixtures
of labour cost, EPL, and training - constitute a crucial source of variation for
disentangling the various mechanisms at work.
2See the seminal papers by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973).
63 The econometric strategy
We are interested in dynamic models in which a high number of labour market
states can be taken into account and it is possible to disentangle the e⁄ect of in-
dividual heterogeneity from the e⁄ect of past labour market experiences. In this
respect, a trade o⁄ is faced when choosing the appropriate econometric model.
On the one hand, continuous time models (e.g., the event-history analysis used
by Bonnal et al., 1997 and Gagliarducci, 2005) are in general more careful about
the dynamics of the process and less on controlling for unobserved heterogeneity,
which is often described as a random e⁄ect that multiplicatively enters a propor-
tional hazard. On the other hand, multi-state models in discrete time allow the
introduction of unobserved ￿xed e⁄ects, possibly correlated with other individ-
ual characteristics, and without the need to resort to distributional assumptions,
but at the cost of a poorer dynamic speci￿cation: usually, a Markov chain. Since
our two main concerns are in ￿ exibly controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
while maintaining a high disaggregation of the labour market states, we follow
the second strategy and use the approach proposed by Magnac (2000).3
The model reads as follows: for each individual i 2 f1;:::;Ng the latent
propensity level y￿
ijt to be in state j 2 f0;:::;Kg at time t 2 f2;:::;Tg is a





￿kj1[yit￿1 = k] + ￿ijt (1)
where 1[￿] is an indicator function and ￿kj are the parameters of interest. The
unobserved components ￿ijt are decomposed into an individual and state speci￿c
e⁄ect ￿ij and residuals uijt. Observed states are the states with maximum
propensity
yit = j if y￿
ijt = Maxl(y￿
ilt) (2)
If the residual components uijt, conditional on ￿ij, are extreme value distributed
and independent across states, individuals and periods, the probability to be in
state j at time t for individual i given that she was in state k in the previous
period, reads
Prfyit = jjyit￿1 = k;￿;￿g =




exp(￿kl ￿ ￿k0 + ￿il ￿ ￿i0)
(3)
Identi￿cation of the state dependence parameters ￿kj requires a normalization
constraint, namely to set to zero the parameters related to one of the destination
states, here j = 0: Therefore, ￿i0 = 0 and ￿k0 = 0, for any k. The interpretation
3In our experience a random-e⁄ect multi-state multi-spell approach is also computationally
more demanding, especially when the number of states considered is high. However, it remains
attractive for the opportunities it o⁄ers to simulate workers￿complete labour market histories
and to perform welfare analysis. We pursue such an approach in a companion paper.
7of the ￿kj is easier once the following ratio is considered, independent of the





= exp(￿kj ￿ ￿0j) (4)
The state parameters ￿kj are identi￿ed once the additional normalization ￿0j =
0, for any j, is imposed. The interpretation is as follows: if ￿kj is positive, the
odds of being in state j with respect to state 0 when the lagged state is k are
larger than when the lagged state is 0.
Choosing "non work" as the reference state, the estimated ￿kj are informa-
tive of the nature of state dependence found in the data, i.e. whether a port of
entry or a trap-e⁄ect dominates for the di⁄erent types of contracts considered.
If a trap-e⁄ect holds, the estimated transition parameters are larger when the
lagged and the current states are equal than when they di⁄er, i.e. ￿kk > ￿kj, for
any j 6= k. In principle, this type of state dependence does not exclude a port
of entry e⁄ect, i.e. ￿k;j=1 > 0, where j = 1 denotes open ended employment. In
this case, the positive state parameter ￿k;j=1 means that getting an open ended
contract as the destination state is easier if the current state is k (say any of the
temporary contracts) instead of non work. Finally ￿k;j=1 > ￿h;j=1implies that
contract k provides a better port of entry with respect to contract h.
Estimation uses a conditional maximum likelihood method (CML). As shown




























1[yit = k] is the number of occurrences of state k for individual i
from time 2 to T ￿1 and B =
￿
b = (yi2;:::;yiT￿1)j8k > 0;
T￿1 P
t=2
1[yit = k] = Yik
￿
is the set of all the possible state sequences that are compatible with the number
of occurrences of each state. This method compares the work histories that are
equivalent in terms of the number of occurrences but di⁄er for the sequence
of the states. The variability between time 2 and T ￿ 1 is informative about
the transitions among states; for this reason, stable histories do not enter the
likelihood function and at least four periods must be observed. As we explain
below, our speci￿cation includes seven labour market states and up to seven
yearly observations are used in the analysis.
Three considerations are in order before applying this econometric approach
to our case. First, we do not explicitly account for initial conditions. This is
viable, because our empirical analysis is based on a sample of entrants in the
8labour market (everybody is in the same state - non work - before their initial
employment spell) and because controlling for individual ￿xed e⁄ects we control
for the initial endowment of human capital and ability.
Second, the model proposed by Magnac works out the problem of unob-
served heterogeneity in a very elegant way without any distributional assump-
tion. Nonetheless, it￿ s not able to take into account the e⁄ect of time varying
covariates. In other words, the state dependence we observe after controlling
for ￿xed e⁄ects could be due to some individual characteristics that vary in
the time interval we observe.4 One obvious candidate is human capital, that is
expected to increase more in open ended and in training contracts. However,
no obvious candidates emerge once we control for the contract type, and hence
indirectly for the possibly di⁄erent rate of accumulation of human capital.
Finally, persistence within a contract can in fact be due to an ongoing screen-
ing process on the match quality - as argued in section 2 - instead of being due
to a true "scarring e⁄ect" of past temporary work. Since in this case the main
issue is the length of the screening period, one way to at least partially control
for this fact is to look at transitions over increasing time intervals: we do this
by estimating the model at one year and at two year intervals. To single out
further the two mechanisms, we next control for the fact that the worker is
employed with the same contract in two points in time in the same ￿rm or in a
di⁄erent ￿rm. Hence we separate transitions not only between/within contracts
but also between/within ￿rms as a further set of labour market states. The
length of the screening process is unobservable; however, if persistence with a
temporary contract within the same ￿rm is "very long" (e.g. four years), this
can be interpreted as indication of a cost reducing behaviour on the part of the
￿rm.
4 The data
To perform our empirical analysis we use WHIP (the Work Histories Italian
Panel), a large work histories dataset built up by LABORatorio R. Revelli from
the Italian social security administration archives 5. This choice allows:
￿ to observe many di⁄erent contracts, i.e. many di⁄erent "bundles" of Em-
ployment Protection provisions, Social Security Contributions and formal
training content: open-ended contract, ￿xed-term contract6, training con-
tract, apprenticeship, freelance work7 and self-employment, whose char-
4Along the lines of Magnac, HonorŁ and Kyriazidou (2000) propose a solution to this
problem. However, the conditions for the identi￿cation of the coe¢ cients of time-varying
characterisitcs - i.e. x(t) should be almost constant when the state changes - are too data-
demanding to be reasonable in our context.
5Full details on the data can be found at www.laboratoriorevelli.itnwhip
6Agency contracts represent only 0.3% of labor market entrants and for tractability are
included among ￿xed-term contracts. See Heyway et al. (2006) for a recent analysis of the
determinants of agency contracts.
7A freelance worker is formally self-employed, hence she enjoys a minimal level of social pro-
9acteristics are summarized in Table 1. 8
Table 1: Main characteristics of contracts.
Contract EPL Training SSC
Open ended high no high
Fixed term low no high
Training low yes low
Apprenticeship low yes very low
Freelance null no low
Self employed null no low
See A pp endix for details.
￿ to select a ￿ ow sample of entrants in employment and follow them for a
long span of time, namely the ￿rst seven years of their working careers,
yet remaining with a large sample size (more than 6000 individual work
histories). To be more speci￿c, we select native people under 40 years of
age never observed in employment between 1985 and 1997 that start their
￿rst paid job during 1998; we then follow them until the end of 2004. In
this way we circumvent the initial condition bias that often a⁄ects the
analysis of labor market transitions: the initial state, indeed, will be non-
employment for everyone in the sample;
￿ for dependent employees, to distinguish between contract transformation
within the same ￿rm and proper labor market transitions across di⁄erent
employers, i.e. contract and ￿rm code are two di⁄erent pieces of informa-
tion, both recorded on a monthly base.
Notice that WHIP￿ s reference population excludes only civil servants hired
on an open ended contract, high skill professions (e.g. lawyers) and workers in
the black economy, by de￿nition. Hence, we exclude from the analysis those who
work with a ￿xed term contract in the public sector, as their eventual transition
to an open ended contract in the same public sector would be unobservable. In
this setting, absences from the archive can be easily labelled "non work" spells,
as transitions back and forth to non observed contracts (mainly a permanent
position in the public sector, or a high skill profession) are extremely unlikely9.
As our econometric approach models transitions across states as a Markov
chain, we record the entry contract as well as the labour market position of
the workers in October of every year from 1998 to 2004. Since identi￿cation
tection, but in many cases her income depends on only one contractor and her tasks are equal
to those performed by dependent employees. They are often labelled "quasi-subordinate"
workers. The appendix provides further details on the institutional framework. See also
Bertolini et al. (2008).
8Our analysis does not distinguish between part time and full time jobs. Robustness checks
showed that the exclusion of part time jobs is inconsequential on our results.
9Unemployment bene￿t recipients are included in the "non work" state, as inevitably are
also employment spells in the black economy.
10requires a minimum of four observations for each individual, the series allows
the estimation at one as well as at two-year intervals.
The next section provides descriptive evidence on both the entry contract
and transition probabilities. We then move to the estimates.
5 Descriptive evidence
We observe 6096 individuals aged 15 to 39 in 1998; about 46% of them are
women. Table 2 details the entry contract shares in 1998: 33% of individuals
start with an open ended contract, 27% as apprentice, about 10% start with
each of the other contracts. Hence more than 56% of the individuals start their
labour market career in a temporary contract.
Gender is a proxy for tastes and a relevant dimension of heterogeneity in
general. Age at entry is a proxy for the initial endowment of ability (education,
time spent looking for the ￿rst job). As table 2 shows, di⁄erences by gender
and age at entry are sizeable. Females are more likely than males to start their
working career with a ￿xed term or freelance contract. Modal age at entry is
between 20 and 24 years. Younger workers (15 - 19 years old) enter mainly
as apprentices. Individuals starting with a ￿xed term contract are younger
than individuals starting with a training contract, while the other contracts and
freelance ones in particular, are more often the entry contracts of more mature
individuals. The share of open ended contracts as entry contract increases
markedly as entry age increases.
Table 2: Entry contract in 1998. Distribution by gender and age at entry.
All Gender Age at entry
Entry Contract Males Females 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39
Open ended 33.19 32.62 33.84 17.7 34.13 39.86 43.62 59.72
Fixed term 12.84 10.99 14.99 9.7 16.39 11.9 9.67 7.99
Training 9.78 10.53 8.91 3.48 10.87 17.7 8.64 0
Apprenticeship 26.59 29.13 23.66 64.98 24.29 1.41 0 0
Freelance 7.37 5.48 9.55 2.23 5.75 13.47 13.99 10.42
Self employed 10.24 11.26 9.05 1.9 8.57 15.66 24.07 21.53
Total 100.00 53.61 46.39 25.02 41.34 20.95 7.97 4.72
C olum n p ercentages. Total: row p ercentages.
Table 3 shows average transition rates in the raw data. The panels contain
transitions at one, two, four and six year distance, respectively. In general
individuals move to the same contract they had, to an open ended contract or
to non work; all other transitions are quite rare. Persistence along the diagonal
appears to be substantial.
Self employees display the largest persistence, with levels fading down slowly
at increasing intervals. Persistence is high for open ended contract workers too,
but it falls more rapidly. Open ended contract workers exhibit a growing transi-
tion rate to non work, con￿rming that open ended contracts do not prevent the
11possibility of losing the job and are far from being an "absorbing state". Fixed
term workers and free-lancers display lower and decreasing levels of persistence,
that nonetheless does not completely disappear at larger intervals. Both types
of contract su⁄er from frequent exits to unemployment but enjoy increasing
transition rates to open ended employment (and to ￿xed term contracts for
the second group).10 Training contracts have a legal maximum duration of 24
months, apprenticeship ones of 60 months (see the appendix): they both expe-
rience a growing transition rate to open ended jobs and a low possibility of exit
to other contracts. The degree of persistence in training contracts completely
fades away at longer intervals11, while declines less rapidly for apprentices. Per-
sistence in non work decreases over time, but it is still at 24% after six years.
Focussing on the last panel of the table, six years after entry, we can observe
the medium-long run outcome of these career paths conditional on their status
in October 1998, the year in which they entered employment for the ￿rst time.
As said one out of four individuals is not working. However, those who had a
freelance contract or an open ended one in 1998 face the highest probabilities of
being not working in 2004 (a further indication that Italian open ended contracts
are not so "permanent"). Almost one out of two is employed with an open
ended contract; those who started with a training contract enjoy the highest
probability of working with an open ended contract in 2004, even higher than
those who started with an open ended contract. In 2004, 7% are employed
with a ￿xed term contract; they entered more often with a ￿xed term or with
a freelance contract, or they were already out of work in October of the entry
year. Self employed face the highest persistence in the contract and the lowest
probabilities of moving to anything else, even to an open ended contract or
out of work. This con￿rms that self employment is a speci￿c choice, a separate
segment of the labour market, with little leakage to dependent employment. On
the other hand, free-lancers move to dependent employment much more often
than "true" self employees.
Finally, in table 4 we separate transitions of employees to the same or to a
di⁄erent ￿rm, at both 12 month (upper panel) and 24 month (lower panel) inter-
vals.12 As expected, the majority of open ended contract employees is employed
in the same ￿rm 12 or 24 months later (mainly with the same contract: 59%
and 78% at one year distance for short and long elapsed tenure respectively),
although the share decreases the longer the interval considered (the previous
￿gures become 51% and 67%). Also ￿xed term contract workers show a high
persistence within the same ￿rm: 25% of ￿xed term contract workers who have
10The distinction between freelancers and a subset of self employees is based upon an "ac-
tivity code" that is likely to su⁄er from measurement errors. The transition intensity between
the two states is therefore less reliable.
11We observe a minimal number of training contracts lasting 25 months, possibly driving
up the estimation of persistence at two year intervals; this is manly due to data construction
reasons: starting and ending a 24-months contract during the same calendar month two years
later is recorded as a 25-months spell in administrative data.
12In the data ￿rm coding for freelancers is di⁄erent from ￿rm coding for employees, so
we cannot observe whether freelancers become employees in the same or in a di⁄erent ￿rm.
Moreover, note that this distinction is not meaningful for the self employed.
12worked for a given ￿rm for at least 24 months are observed again within the
same ￿rm after 24 more months under a ￿xed term contract (￿fth column in the
lower panel), while only 22% of them are observed within the same ￿rm after 24
more months with an open ended contract (column three). This is an example
of a "very long" - at least 48 months - screening process.
Training contracts can last up to 24 months within the same ￿rm; if they are
transformed into an open ended one before expiring the ￿rm retains the social
security rebate till the original end of the training contract. Nonetheless, ￿rms
seem to wait for the end of the contract to eventually transform it into an open
ended one. In fact, of those who have spent less than one year as trainee in a
￿rm, more than half are still trainees in the same ￿rm after 12 more months
(column seven in the upper panel), while only 13% are still working there with
an open ended contract. After two years nobody can be still a trainee in the
same ￿rm, and 52% of them are converted into an open ended contract (lower
panel, third column, shorter tenure); another 21% has moved to a di⁄erent
￿rm. Apprentices follow a similar pattern, i.e. the majority of them is still
employed as apprentice in the same ￿rm at one year distance; almost 20% of
longer tenure apprentices are promoted to an open ended contract instead; at
two year distance 20% of them is still an apprentice in the same ￿rm, while
about 40% have an open ended contract within the same ￿rm. For them an
open ended contract with a di⁄erent ￿rm is a less likely event (11% of long
tenure apprentices, after 2 more years). Hence it seems that apprentices follow
the pattern already observed for trainees, although with lower probabilities of
transition.
In conclusion, it seems that workers face a quite long cursus honorum within
the ￿rm before obtaining an open ended contract. However, the evidence de-
picted so far mixes up the e⁄ects of heterogeneity, of genuine port of entry and
of true scarring. In the next section we estimate the transition model and try
to disentangle these components.
6 Econometric Results
In this section we present our CML estimates of ￿kj at 12 as well as at 24
month intervals (in which case we exploit the minimum of four observations
per individual required by Magnac￿ s approach). The estimates are arranged in
tables that show, for each ￿kj, the origin state (k) by rows and the destination
state (j) by columns. In other words, within each row one reads the odds of
taking di⁄erent contracts keeping the origin state constant; each column in turn
displays the odds of taking one speci￿c contract for di⁄erent lagged conditions.
Non work is taken as the reference state. Therefore positive (negative) ￿gures
mean that the odds of taking contract j with respect to non work when the
lagged state is k are larger (smaller) than when the lagged state is non work.
Thus, if ￿k0j > ￿k00j the odds of taking contract j (with respect to non work)
when the lagged state is k0 are larger than when the lagged state is k00. Similarly,
if ￿kj0 > ￿kj00 the odds of taking contract j0 when the lagged state is k are larger
13than the odds of taking contract j00.
First, we compare our CML estimates of ￿kj, obtained after the individual
￿xed e⁄ects have been eliminated, with simpler estimates of ￿kj, call them dkj,
obtained from a multinomial logit approach that only controls for the lagged
state, i.e. without controlling for the individual ￿xed e⁄ects. The CML esti-
mates of ￿kj are reported in table 6 for the one year transitions and in table
8 for the two year transitions. The corresponding dkj estimates are reported,
respectively, in tables 5 and 7. This comparison is informative about individual
heterogeneity: as long as it plays a role in sorting workers among di⁄erent con-
tracts, we expect the state dependence coe¢ cients to change after individual
e⁄ects (￿ij) are controlled for. In particular, we expect the coe¢ cients on the
main diagonal to decrease, since the same individual characteristics that sort a
worker into one contract are likely to further retain her there. Our ￿ndings sup-
port this hypothesis: persistence decreases substantially and signi￿cantly after
￿xed e⁄ects are controlled for, as it is immediately clear comparing the main
diagonals in Table 5 and 6, and in Table 7 and 8.
Claim 1 Individual heterogeneity explains part of the observed persistence in
the same contract. The e⁄ect is an overestimation.
Insights about the port of entry hypothesis are provided by the estimates
reported under the column labelled "open ended" in tables 6 and 8. All the
estimated ￿k;j=1 are positive, for any k. Therefore, once individual ￿xed e⁄ects
are controlled for, open ended jobs are more easily accessible from employment
than from non employment. This is true for every contract of origin but freelance
work, whose port of entry e⁄ect fades away before two years. An ordering
among the contracts with respect to the probability of taking an open ended
job emerges, with training contracts at the top, freelance work at the bottom
and ￿xed term contracts outperforming apprenticeship ones. Training contracts
display the highest coe¢ cient both at one and at two year distance, possibly
implying a positive e⁄ect of their formal training content. An e⁄ect not so
evident for apprentices, probably due to their longer maximum duration (5
years). Notice that Magnac (2000) ￿nds the opposite result: in France, training
programmes are not more e⁄ective than o⁄-the-job search in ￿nding an open
ended position.13
Claim 2 The port of entry hypothesis holds; in particular, training contracts
represent the best port of entry to open ended employment, freelance work the
worst.
This notwithstanding, persistence is still far from fading away. Table 6 shows
that for any given contract, the most likely destination state is the same contract,
even after ￿xed e⁄ects have been removed. At one year distance, each contract
maximum stated duration might play a role: training and apprenticeship con-
tracts, whose maximum legal durations are two and ￿ve years respectively, may
13The objection that employers are forced by the law to retain at least 50% of the trainees
is not relevant since retention rate is well above 50% (see table 3).
14be an example, but not free-lancers or ￿xed term contract workers, whose work
relationships are shorter than one year on average. However, we expect persis-
tence to decrease when computed at larger intervals. Table 8 shows that the
coe¢ cients on the main diagonal actually decrease, but are still the row-speci￿c
highest ￿gures. Two aspects are worth a comment: i) persistence in open ended
jobs falls dramatically at 24 months, con￿rming that open ended contracts do
not completely prevent a worker from losing her current job; ii) self employment
is more likely to be a permanent choice of the worker; this induces the very high
persistence and the very low transition coe¢ cients we read in the tables.
Claim 3 Retaining the same contract is always the most likely destination, at
one as well as at two year intervals, even after individual e⁄ects are controlled
for.
Finally, we estimate the model separating movements within the same ￿rm or
toward a di⁄erent ￿rm, in order to disentangle a true scarring e⁄ect of temporary
employment from a cost reduction behaviour of the employers who might be
using temporary contracts simply as a cheaper production factor (as discussed
in section 2). We focus on two year transitions, as this length of time excludes
the e⁄ect of stated contract duration for trainees, and more in general it is
longer than a screening period of average length.
We expect statistical discrimination to a⁄ect transitions across ￿rms, since a
new employer is more likely to have a worse guess about workers￿productivity;
on the contrary, we will interpret retention under temporary contracts in the
same ￿rm as evidence of a cost reduction behaviour, when lasting over two years.
On the other hand, evidence of transitions toward open ended contracts may be
interpreted either as a cursus honorum when it occurs within the ￿rms, or as a
more general port of entry when across ￿rms.
To keep the analysis tractable we exclude individuals who have been appren-
tices, free-lancers or self employed at least once in the observation period. The
last two groups have no ￿rm coding, so their inclusion would add nothing to
the previous analysis; the ￿rst includes very young individuals on a potentially
very long contract, so their exclusion is not too costly.
Table 9 presents the results, once again obtained with the ￿xed e⁄ect dy-
namic multinomial logit model; they can be read as in table 8. There is no
evidence of port of entry into a new ￿rm (col. 1), i.e. having had a temporary
job in the past or coming from non work provides the same probability of get-
ting an open ended job in a new ￿rm. There is only one port of entry across
￿rms, i.e. having had a long (more than 2 years) open ended employment spell
increases signi￿cantly the probability of getting an open ended contract in a new
￿rm with respect to the probability faced by those who were not employed. This
may suggest that both the general purpose training and the network building
e⁄ects mentioned in section 2 are not at work with any temporary contract,or
that they fade away quite quickly. On the other hand, persistence in temporary
jobs across ￿rms is not signi￿cant (col. 3 and 5, last three rows), hinting that
also the scarring e⁄ects of temporary contracts are weak or fade away quickly.
15However, within ￿rm patterns are totally di⁄erent: both port of entry and
contract persistence emerge. Training and - to a slightly lower extent - ￿xed
term contracts help signi￿cantly to obtain an open ended contract in the same
￿rm (signi￿cantly positive ￿kj in the last three rows of column 2, Table 9).
However, the probability of working with a ￿xed term contract in the same ￿rm
at 24 month distance is higher than the probability to obtain an open ended
contract in the same ￿rm; this is so for those who have worked in the ￿rm for
less as well as for more than 24 months with a ￿xed term contract, but it is so
even for trainees whose most likely outcome is a ￿xed term contract within the
￿rm, and not an open ended one (￿kj in the last three rows of col. 4 larger than
the corresponding ￿kj in col. 2).
Concluding, persistence in temporary jobs occurs within the ￿rm, meaning
that employers use temporary contracts as a cost reduction device, as suggested
also by G￿ell and Petrongolo (2007). In fact, transitions are computed at in-
tervals larger than the average duration of the contracts and larger than any
reasonable screening period (up to 48 months in the ￿rm); moreover, averaging
over the ￿rst six years of one￿ s career prevents any possible start up period bias.
Claim 4 Temporary jobs do not represent either a scarring event or a port of
entry into a new ￿rm; they are likely to be used as a cost reduction device within
the ￿rm. The port of entry e⁄ect is taken over by an internal cursus honorum
e⁄ect.
7 Conclusions
Are temporary jobs a port of entry toward more stable career patterns, or
do they engender a trapping risk into precarious employment? Studying the
transitions of an Italian sample of labour market entrants over a long time
period, and controlling for workers￿sorting across the di⁄erent contracts due to
unobserved heterogeneity, we have highlighted several aspects of this issue.
First, ￿xed-term jobs, apprenticeship and training programmes act as a port
of entry into open-ended employment - providing a signi￿cantly higher proba-
bility of obtaining such contract with respect to the one faced by non-working
individuals - while freelance contracts don￿ t. We have stressed how di⁄erent
combinations of EPL provisions, public subsidies, formal training contents and
legal bindings may provide ￿rms with di⁄erent incentives to retain workers un-
der temporary contract arrangements as opposed to convert these jobs into open
ended positions. Strong SSC rebates, no training requirements and low legal
constraints concerning renewals result in a poor port-of-entry performance, as
in the case of freelance contracts. Instead, mandatory training and more bind-
ing legal constraints on the use, extension and renewals of temporary contracts
tend to enhance the probability of getting a standard job, as in the case of the
Italian training programmes.
Second, this port-of-entry e⁄ect coexist with a trap e⁄ect, meaning that
even if working is (almost) always better than not working in order to get an
16open-ended job, the most likely outcome of an employment spell is retaining the
same contract. Persistence is therefore substantial too.
A joint interpretation of these two facts becomes easier once a third result is
taken into account. After controlling for the identity of the employer, both the
port-of-entry and the trap e⁄ects are taken over by an internal cursus honorum
e⁄ect, i.e. a long persistence with temporary contracts within the same ￿rm
possibly followed by an advancement to an open ended contract. The state
dependence generated by temporary contracts across ￿rms fades away within
two years, implying that both positive (port of entry) and negative (scarring)
e⁄ects of these contracts are not permanent. Their lasting e⁄ects (positive
as well as negative) are ￿rm speci￿c. We interpret these results as evidence
of the little general-purpose training received by temporary workers and of a
cost-reduction strategy followed by the employers, who retain their employees
under a ￿ exible arrangement as long as they can and in any case well beyond a
reasonable screening period. This view is consistent with open-ended contracts
being the only port of entry across di⁄erent ￿rms, another result we obtain in
this paper.
By distinguishing among the di⁄erent labour market arrangements our analy-
sis has shed further light on the port-of-entry literature: it has intended to
demonstrate that it￿ s not just more easily accessible employment spells per se
that provide workers with valuable paths to permanent employment, but speci￿c
combinations of public subsidies, training and legal constraints. By controlling
for the identity of the employer we have also shown that more desirable e⁄ects
(the stepping stone role of temporary jobs) may coexist with less desirable ones
(cost reduction strategies and trap e⁄ects). In short, we have stressed that the
answer to the question posed in the title ultimately depends on two crucial cir-
cumstances: the speci￿c type of temporary contract one holds and whether the
transition between di⁄erent contractual arrangements occur within the same
employer or across di⁄erent employers.
Finally, since having a temporary job is from many perspectives worse than
holding an open ended contract, the next question becomes: how long does a
worker take to enter an open ended job? And with what welfare cost over her
entire career? This involves duration analysis and simulation of welfare levels.
We leave this path to our next research.
8 Appendix: institutional framework and con-
tracts
Our analysis covers the years 1998 - 2004, i.e. the period immediately after
the ￿ exibilization of the Italian labour market was fully implemented. In fact,
the period of analysis follows the 1997 "Treu" law that introduced agency con-
tracts, reformed ￿xed term contracts and apprenticeship, promoted the di⁄usion
of part time jobs and training contracts and reintroduced probation contracts
(tirocinio). Another type of ￿ exible jobs, freelance work, had been introduced
17in the seventies, but strongly promoted only since 1996. The last year in the
data is 2004, before another comprehensive reform, the Law 30/2003 ("Legge
Biagi"), was actually implemented. So we focus on a period in which legislation
on temporary contracts was quite constant (with the exception of 2001 freelance
and ￿xed term contracts￿reforms).
A brief discussion of the di⁄erent features of the various contract types is in
order.
- Open ended contracts have no stated duration, no training obligations and
no social security rebates. They can be broken through individual or collective
layo⁄s. Individual layo⁄s in Italy are allowed at no cost for just cause only.14
If a judge rules that the dismissal lacked the ground of just cause, larger ￿rms
(more than ￿fteen employees) are forced to re-hire the worker and to pay her
a compensation; in smaller ￿rms a severance payment is due.15 In larger ￿rms
layo⁄s occur mainly through collective dismissals, whose access is not di¢ cult.
- Fixed term contracts were introduced in Italy in 1962 but never widely
used; collective bargaining allowed their use more and more over the ￿ 90s and
the 1997 law set an easier access to them for all ￿rms by law; their almost
complete liberalization occurred in 2001. In fact, there is no maximum duration
for ￿xed term contracts but sequences of ￿xed term contracts within the same
￿rm are allowed. They provide for no training obligations and no social security
rebates.
- Agency contracts were introduced in 1997 and became e⁄ective in 1998.For
this reason the share of agency workers in our sample - the ￿ ow of workers who
entered the labor market on 1998 - is very small and we aggregate them to ￿xed
term workers. With agency contracts the provider hires the worker and sends
her to the ￿rm; the ￿rm pays the wage to the worker (without reductions) and
a search cost to the provider. They can last for a maximum of 24 months but
are renewable within the same ￿rm. They provide for no training obligations
and no social security rebates.16
- The training contract was introduced in 1984. It can last a maximum of
24 months and is not renewable within the same ￿rm. Only individuals under
32 years of age can be hired with this contract. It provides to the ￿rm from
25% to almost 100% rebate on the Social Security contributions; to the worker
a minimum of formal training.17
- Apprenticeship was introduced in the early Fifties. Apprentices receive a
minimum amount of external and on the job training and the employer enjoys a
full Social Security contributions rebate. Its maximum duration is 5 years and
is not renewable within the same ￿rm. Only individuals under 24 years of age
can be hired with this contract.
- Free-lancers are formally self employed but in most cases their income
depends on only one contractor and their tasks are equal to those performed by
14Misconduct, but also ￿rm restructuring or lack of demand.
15See Garibaldi et al. (2004) for details.
16For details on this contract see Ichino et al (2008).
17The rebate di⁄ers according to regional unemployment rate, and has been decreased over
time. See Contini et al. (2003) for details.
18employees; they are often called quasi-subordinate workers. No training has to
be provided by the ￿rm. Social security contributions are lower than those of
dependent workers. When the contract was introduced in 1996 it was for non-
manual jobs only, but this limitation disappeared in 2001. Freelance contracts
can be extended and repeated at will.
- Self employed workers observed in WHIP include all professional persons
without an autonomous social security fund, as well as artisans and traders.
Since they are proper self employees, there￿ s no room for questions about max-
imum duration, extensions and renewals.
In general, the use of temporary contracts of any kind to substitute work-
ers on strike is forbidden and sequences of temporary contracts face no limits
provided the employer is di⁄erent.
19References
[1] Addison JT, Sur￿eld CJ. Does atypical help the jobless? Evidence from a
CAEAS/CPS cohort analysis. Applied Economics, 2009, 41, 1077-1087.
[2] Alonso-Borrego C, FernÆndez-Villaverde C, GÆldon-SÆnchez JE. Evaluating
labor market reforms: a general equilibrium approach. NBER Working
Paper 2005; 11519.
[3] Arrow K 1973. The theory of discrimination. In: Ashenfelter O, Rees A
(Eds), Discrimination in labor markets. Princeton University Press: Prince-
ton; 1973. p. 3-33.
[4] Autor DH, Houseman SN. Do temporary help jobs improve labor market
outcomes? A pilot analysis with welfare clients. Cambridge, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology 2002, mimeo.
[5] Bassanini A, Booth AL, Brunello G, De Paola M, Leuven E. Workplace
training in Europe. IZA Discussion Paper 2005; 1640.
[6] Bentolila S, Bertola G. Firing costs and labor demand: How bad is eu-
rosclerosis? Review of Economic Studies 1990; 57; 3; 381-402.
[7] Bertola G. Job security, employment, and wages. European Economic Re-
view 1990; 34; 851-886.
[8] Bertolini S, M￿hlberger U. The organizational governance of work relation-
ships between employment and self-employment. Socio-Economic Review
2008; 6 (3); 449-472.
[9] Berton F, Garibaldi P. Workers and ￿rm sorting into temporary jobs. LRR
Working Paper 2006; 51.
[10] Berton F, Richiardi M, Sacchi S. Flexinsecurity. PerchŁ in Italia la ￿ essibil-
it￿ diventa precariet￿. Il Mulino: Bologna; 2009.
[11] Blanchard OJ, Landier A. The perverse e⁄ect of partial labor market re-
forms: ￿xed duration contracts in France. Economic Journal 2002; 112;
F214-F244.
[12] Bonnal L, Fougere D, Serandon A. Evaluating the Impact of French Em-
ployment Policies on Individual Labor Market Histories. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 1997; 64; 4; 683-713.
[13] Booth AL. An analysis of ￿ring costs and their implications for unemploy-
ment policy. In: Snower D, de la Dehesa G (Eds), Unemployment Policy.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; 1997. p. 359-388.
[14] Booth AL, Francesconi M, Frank J. Temporary jobs: stepping stones or
dead ends? Economic Journal 2002; 112; F189-F213.
20[15] Bover O, Gomez R. Another look at unemployment duration: exit to a
open ended vs. a temporary job. Investigaciones Econ￿micas 2004; 28; 2;
285-314.
[16] Casquel E, Cunyat A. The dynamics of temporary jobs in Spain. Royal
Economic Society Annual Conference 2004; 141.
[17] Clark A, Postel-Vinay F. Job security and job protection. Oxford Economic
Papers 2009; 61; 207-239.
[18] Contini B, Cornaglia F, Mapede C, Rettore E 2003. Measuring the impact
of the Italian CFL programme on the job opportunities for the youths. In:
Castellino O, Fornero E (Eds), Pension policy in an integrating Europe,
Edward Elgar Press: ; 2003.
[19] D￿ Addio AC, Rosholm M. Exits from temporary jobs in Europe: A com-
peting risk analysis. Labour Economics 2005; 12; 449-468.
[20] De Graaf-Zijl M, Van den Berg G, Heyma M. Stepping stones for the un-
employed: the e⁄ect of temporary jobs on the duration unitl regular work.
IZA Discussion Paper 2004; 1241.
[21] Dolado JJ, Garc￿a-Serrano C, Jimeno JF. Drawing lessons from the boom
of temporary jobs in Spain. The Economic Journal 2002; 112; F270-F295.
[22] Gagliarducci S. The dynamics of repeated temporary jobs. Labour Eco-
nomics 2005; 12; 429-448.
[23] Garibaldi P, Pacelli L, Borgarello, A. Employment protection legislation
and the size of ￿rms. Il giornale degli Economisti 2004
[24] G￿ell M, Petrongolo B. How binding are legal limits? Transitions from
temporary to permanent work in Spain. Labour Economics 2007; 14; 153-
183.
[25] Hagen T. Do ￿xed-term contracts increase the long-term employment op-
portunities of the unemployed? ZEW Discussion Paper 2003; 03-49.
[26] Heywood J, Siebert S, Wei X. Examining the determinants of agency work:
do family friendly practices play a role? IZA Discussion paper, 2006, No.
2413.
[27] HonorŁ BE, Kyriazidou E. Panel data discrete choice models with lagged
dependent variables. Econometrica 2000; 68; 4; 839-874.
[28] Hotchkiss JL. The e⁄ect of transitional employment on search duration: a
selectivity approach. Atlantic Economic Journal 1999; 27; 1; 38-52.
[29] Ichino A, Mealli F, Nannicini T. From temporary help jobs to permanent
employment: what can we learn from matching estimators and their sensi-
tivity? Journal of Applied Econometrics 2008; 23; 3; 305-327.
21[30] ILO. The scope of the employment relationship. Report V, International
Labour Conference, 91st session, Geneva; 2003.
[31] Magnac T. Subsidised training and youth unemployment: distinguishing
unobserved heterogeneity from state dependence in labor market histories.
The Economic Journal 2000; 110; 466; 805 - 837.
[32] OECD. Employment Outlook. Paris; 2000.
[33] Phelps ES. The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism. American Eco-
nomic Review 1972; 62; 659-661.
[34] Picchio M. Temporary jobs and transition to stable jobs in Italy. Labour
2008; 22; 1.
[35] Van Ours JC, Vodopivec M. How shortening the potential duration of un-
employment bene￿ts a⁄ects the duration of unemployment: evidence from
a natural experiment. Journal of Labor Economics 2006; 24; 2; 351-378.
22Table 3: Raw transition rates among contracts, at increasing time intervals.
Origin Destination
One year Non work Open ended Fixed term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self employed
Non work 61.96 14.04 7.41 3.03 7.44 2.31 3.81
Open ended 12.14 81.30 2.99 1.10 0.92 0.42 1.13
Fixed term 25.19 26.31 38.10 4.87 2.86 1.34 1.34
Training 11.97 39.96 5.18 40.17 1.18 0.48 1.07
Apprenticeship 15.21 15.58 2.26 1.55 63.82 0.29 1.30
Freelance 33.18 11.53 6.94 2.24 1.88 36.94 7.29
Self employed 5.85 2.53 0.97 0.30 0.27 0.52 89.57
Total 27.32 37.75 6.28 3.88 11.08 1.86 11.83
Two years Non work Open ended Fixed term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self employed
Non work 49.79 20.29 8.59 3.75 9.52 2.51 5.54
Open ended 16.20 73.71 4.12 1.60 1.48 0.63 2.26
Fixed term 26.50 34.10 25.46 5.41 4.43 1.97 2.13
Training 15.65 70.07 4.68 5.71 1.26 0.46 2.17
Apprenticeship 17.34 28.67 3.49 3.00 43.83 0.55 3.12
Freelance 40.80 17.17 6.73 3.71 3.16 19.09 9.34
Self employed 9.13 4.87 1.41 0.49 0.34 0.74 83.03
Total 26.60 40.34 6.42 2.82 9.97 1.69 12.15
Four years Non work Open ended Fixed term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self employed
Non work 35.18 31.23 9.79 2.77 10.06 2.57 8.39
Open ended 21.65 64.35 5.27 1.34 1.98 1.03 4.38
Fixed term 24.24 48.29 15.53 2.60 3.68 1.44 4.22
Training 16.09 73.91 3.78 1.19 0.89 0.74 3.41
Apprenticeship 19.12 46.98 4.58 2.39 19.29 1.16 6.47
Freelance 40.84 27.10 6.30 1.15 2.48 9.92 12.21
Self employed 14.94 9.14 1.90 0.28 0.56 1.11 72.07
Total 25.04 44.53 6.76 1.91 7.22 1.79 12.75
Six years Non work Open ended Fixed term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self employed
Non work 24.01 44.09 11.00 0.88 8.35 2.02 9.65
Open ended 29.15 54.67 6.00 0.70 1.60 1.12 6.76
Fixed term 22.56 54.62 10.00 2.05 2.56 1.79 6.41
Training 19.33 69.23 3.35 0.39 0.59 1.18 5.92
Apprenticeship 21.60 50.24 6.28 1.33 11.42 0.86 8.28
Freelance 40.82 31.84 7.87 0.37 1.50 4.87 12.73
Self employed 18.50 10.40 1.54 0.19 0.39 1.54 67.44
Total 24.59 47.00 7.37 0.87 5.30 1.61 13.27
R ow p ercentages.
23Table 4: Raw transition rates among contracts at one and two year interval, to
the same or to an other ￿rm.
Origin Destination
1 year Non work Open ended Fixed term Training Apprentices
Elapsed tenure and
other/same ￿rm Other Same Other Same Other Same Other Same
Non work 61.96 14.04 7.41 3.03 7.44
Open ended <12 months 18.90 11.86 59.46 3.65 0.74 1.37 0.63 1.19 0.43
>12 months 8.32 9.31 77.62 1.95 0.25 0.54 0.05 0.40 0.13
Fixed term <12 months 27.24 11.63 14.60 12.70 22.20 3.15 2.67 2.43 0.53
>12 months 18.95 9.39 17.15 8.48 39.35 0.90 1.08 1.99 0.54
Training <12 months 11.65 6.70 13.22 3.04 2.87 5.48 53.22 1.57 0.09
>12 months 12.47 10.94 60.94 1.80 2.22 1.80 8.86 0.28 0.14
Apprentices <12 months 18.98 4.80 2.40 2.36 0.22 1.57 0.09 10.30 58.20
>12 months 11.73 4.78 18.52 1.73 0.24 1.33 0.12 5.87 53.64
Total 27.32 9.74 28.01 4.36 1.93 1.79 2.09 3.67 7.41
2 years Non work Open ended Fixed term Training Apprentices
Elapsed tenure and
other/same ￿rm Other Same Other Same Other Same Other Same
Non work 51.60 19.81 8.95 3.05 8.21
Open ended <24 months 17.36 20.94 50.63 4.21 0.42 1.70 1.54 0.22
>24 months 10.68 15.29 67.14 2.56 0.22 0.54 0.44 0.08
Fixed term <24 months 25.74 19.03 15.91 13.26 12.64 3.98 3.35 0.55
>24 months 24.05 8.23 21.52 7.59 25.32 2.53 3.16 0.63
Training <24 months 14.51 20.77 52.02 3.52 1.20 2.92 0.86 0.00
>24 months (*)
Apprentices <24 months 16.95 10.97 14.90 3.03 0.31 3.39 12.80 34.21
>24 months 12.09 10.50 40.21 3.28 0.56 1.97 6.09 19.68
Total 25.77 16.32 26.26 5.40 1.06 2.13 4.49 4.09
R ow p ercentages.
Q uasi sub ord. and Self em ployed as in Table 2 and not rep orted; no ￿rm co de available.
(*) A training contract can not last m ore than 24 m onths in the sam e ￿rm . It can b e observed as a sp ell of 25 m onths for data
construction reasons
24Table 5: d(kj) estimates without individual ￿xed e⁄ects, one year interval
Origin Destination
Open ended Fixed term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self employed
Open ended 3.186 0.437 0.405 -0.539 -0.347 0.123
0.037 0.067 0.102 0.094 0.152 0.100
Fixed term 1.055 2.378 1.024 -0.491 -0.091 -0.590
0.059 0.058 0.110 0.130 0.191 0.187
Training 2.260 0.864 4.259 -0.557 -0.370 -0.022
0.071 0.120 0.084 0.214 0.344 0.231
Apprenticeship 0.936 -0.292 0.234 3.251 -1.182 -0.246
0.054 0.104 0.128 0.050 0.268 0.139
Freelance 0.103 0.106 0.114 -1.045 3.400 0.832
0.107 0.139 0.210 0.231 0.091 0.140
Self employed 0.405 0.089 -0.141 -1.206 1.754 5.389
0.117 0.172 0.289 0.309 0.151 0.079
M ultinom ial logit estim ates, no controls. S.e. in second row s. B old if 95 p ct signi￿cant.
Table 6: delta(kj) estimates controlling for individual ￿xed e⁄ects, one year
interval
Origin Destination
Open ended Fixed term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self employed
Open ended 2.600 0.612 0.028 -0.556 0.246 0.385
0.066 0.094 0.138 0.137 0.211 0.181
Fixed term 1.221 1.826 1.027 0.036 0.471 0.155
0.092 0.099 0.169 0.186 0.247 0.288
Training 1.633 1.284 3.870 -0.123 0.639 0.225
0.121 0.174 0.203 0.283 0.434 0.344
Apprenticeship 0.684 0.124 0.331 2.288 -0.744 -0.321
0.095 0.154 0.201 0.095 0.418 0.271
Freelance 0.513 0.843 0.727 -0.125 2.283 1.363
0.189 0.197 0.375 0.411 0.182 0.265
Self employed 0.463 0.701 0.042 -0.169 0.915 3.569
0.218 0.292 0.442 0.429 0.412 0.168
D iscrete tim e dynam ic m ultinom ial logit w ith ￿xed e⁄ects estim ates. S.e. in second row s. B old if 95 p ct signi￿cant.
25Table 7: d(kj) estimates without individual ￿xed e⁄ects, two year interval
Origin Destination
Open ended Fixed term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self employed
Open ended 3.186 0.437 0.405 -0.539 -0.347 0.123
0.037 0.067 0.102 0.094 0.152 0.100
Fixed term 1.055 2.378 1.024 -0.491 -0.091 -0.590
0.059 0.058 0.110 0.130 0.191 0.187
Training 2.260 0.864 4.259 -0.557 -0.370 -0.022
0.071 0.120 0.084 0.214 0.344 0.231
Apprenticeship 0.936 -0.292 0.234 3.251 -1.182 -0.246
0.054 0.104 0.128 0.050 0.268 0.139
Freelance 0.103 0.106 0.114 -1.045 3.400 0.832
0.107 0.139 0.210 0.231 0.091 0.140
Self employed 0.405 0.089 -0.141 -1.206 1.754 5.389
0.117 0.172 0.289 0.309 0.151 0.079
M ultinom ial logit estim ates, no controls. S.e. in second row s. B old if 95 p ct signi￿cant.
A training contract can not last m ore than 24 m onths in the sam e ￿rm . It can b e observed as a sp ell of 25 m onths for data
construction reasons. H ence, d(training,training) estim ates at tw o year distance are not totally reliable.
Table 8: delta(kj) estimates controlling for individual ￿xed e⁄ects, two year
interval
Origin Destination
Open ended Fixed term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self employed
Open ended 1.736 0.432 -0.206 -0.506 -0.028 0.574
0.131 0.174 0.241 0.221 0.395 0.357
Fixed term 0.694 1.599 0.654 0.590 1.306 -0.787
0.170 0.224 0.337 0.335 0.513 0.566
Training 1.422 0.786 2.180 0.009 -0.514 0.898
0.202 0.320 0.538 0.448 0.848 0.597
Apprenticeship 0.354 0.384 0.557 1.942 -0.904 -0.763
0.173 0.247 0.371 0.215 0.648 0.460
Freelance 0.142 0.703 1.034 0.101 1.286 1.178
0.326 0.368 0.733 0.714 0.367 0.502
Self employed 0.851 0.277 0.711 -0.696 -0.561 3.543
0.413 0.537 0.869 0.985 1.126 0.436
D iscrete tim e dynam ic m ultinom ial logit w ith ￿xed e⁄ects estim ates. S.e. in second row s. B old if 95 p ct signi￿cant
A training contract can not last m ore than 24 m onths in the sam e ￿rm . It can b e observed as a sp ell of 25 m onths for data
construction reasons. H ence, delta(training,training) estim ates at tw o year distance are not totally reliable.
26Table 9: delta(kj) estimates controlling for individual ￿xed e⁄ects, two year
interval, to the same or to an other ￿rm.
Origin Destination
Elapsed tenure and Open ended Fixed term Training
other/same ￿rm Other Same Other Same Other
Open ended <24 months 0.316 4.592 0.404 3.781 0.018
0.191 0.391 0.248 1.701 0.368
>24 months 0.809 5.078 -0.120 1.347 -1.051
0.327 0.511 0.488 2.298 0.615
Fixed term <24 months -0.385 2.395 0.458 5.963 -0.063
0.261 0.419 0.332 1.668 0.556
>24 months -0.782 3.544 -0.012 5.353 1.459
1.685 1.460 1.451 2.761 3.341
Training <24 months -0.530 3.391 -0.687 4.716 0.934
0.333 0.458 0.494 1.841 0.848
D iscrete tim e dynam ic m ultinom ial logit w ith ￿xed e⁄ects estim ates.
S.e. in second row s. B old if 95 p ct signi￿cant
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